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INTRODUCTION
In Delhi, under British rule, the government provided a bounty on
dead cobras in an attempt to reduce the population of the deadly snake.
Eventually, some people employing the motto of “work smarter, not
harder,” began breeding cobras for the bounty, leading to an increase in
the cobra population when the cobras inevitably escaped. History is replete
with examples of these well-intentioned laws that either exacerbated the
existing problem or created even larger auxiliary issues. Such instances
have become known as “the cobra effect”;1 other examples come from the
French “rat-tail” bounty of Hanoi2 and essentially every animal
importation decision that concerned the colonization of Australia.3 To this
infamous list can be added the inter partes review proceeding recently
developed in the American patent system: by trying to limit the amount of
meritless patent infringement suits, the system has increased the number
of meritless administrative inter partes review challenges to patents.
The patent system in the United States was forever changed with the
introduction of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in September
of 2011. The AIA brought sweeping changes to American patent law in
* J.D., Seattle University, 2017; B.S. Biological Science, Biola University, 2009. I would like to
express my gratitude to my loving wife for supporting me throughout the entire process of finishing
law school and this Note, and to Professor Kaustuv Das for all of his advice and guidance.
1. See generally HORST SIEBERT, DER KOBRA-EFFEKT (2002).
2. See Michael G. Vann, Of Rats, Rice, and Race: The Great Hanoi Rat Massacre, an Episode
in French Colonial History, in 4 FRENCH COLONIAL HISTORY 191, 191–93 (2003). A law in Frenchruled Hanoi aimed to decrease the rampant rat population. In order to collect the bounty, one needed
to provide the government with a rat tail as proof. Unfortunately, humans rarely do more than the bare
minimum, and eventually many tailless rats were roaming the streets, doing little to stem the
population. Id.
3. See generally Feral Animals in Australia, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T ENV’T & ENERGY,
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive-species/feral-animals-australia [https://perma.
cc/L9VU-WQNJ]. Especially prominent was the introduction of the cane toad, which was initially
introduced to combat beetles but has caused millions of dollars’ worth of damage to the Australian
ecosystem. Id.
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order to align the U.S. with much of the rest of the world by changing the
invention priority from a “first to invent” to a “first to file” system. Among
the many other changes included in the AIA, two of particular import to
this Note are the inter partes review and the transitory covered business
method patent review.
Understanding this Note will necessitate having knowledge of
multiple patent review procedures, which I postulate can be combined to
create a workable solution for the current issues that have arisen with inter
partes reviews. Therefore, in the first section I will provide a brief
overview of the substance of inter partes reviews and some of the most
critical negatives that have become apparent since 2013. I will also give a
brief look at the similarities and key differences between inter partes
reviews and the covered business method patent reviews, and the
advantages they give to certain classes of patents. The section will
conclude by looking at the European equivalent procedure of inter partes
reviews, known as oppositions.
The second section of this Note will highlight the imperfections and
abuses that have become apparent with the inter partes review process,
especially in how the biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries4
have been negatively impacted or threatened. Next, I will give reasons why
the biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries need to have further
protections from inter partes review abuses to continue providing
technologies that help make the world a better place.
This Note will then conclude with proposed amendments to the inter
partes review procedure, combining elements of covered business method
reviews and oppositions that could be used to ease the burden on the
biotech industry, to provide a better system for ensuring that developers of
drugs can spend more time in the laboratory and less time in the court
room. This system should help correctly incentivize companies to continue
spending the incredible amount of capital required to bring a drug to
market with proper patent protections intact, but it would further the goal
of inter partes reviews in providing an efficient way of invalidating
meritless patents.
I.

POST-ISSUANCE CHALLENGES TO PATENTS

The original intent in creating post-issuance reviews in the AIA5 was
to reduce the cost and timeline of litigating challenges to patents in the
4. Throughout this Note, for ease of reading and because there is a significant amount of overlap
between the industries, I will be using the term “biotech” to cover the biotechnology,
biopharmaceutical, and pharmaceutical industries.
5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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courtroom.6 While still a lengthy and costly process, inter partes reviews
do fulfill that purpose by drastically reducing the timeline of the
proceedings. Another intention was to decrease the amount of frivolous
lawsuits brought by “patent trolls.”7 Patent trolls are hard to uniformly
define, but are largely viewed as non-practicing entities (NPE), or patentasserting entities,8 that purchase patents—not to profit from making a
product—but as a business strategy to then sue manufacturers for
infringing on those patents.9
In order to develop a better system for efficiently challenging any
administrative post-issuance challenge, it is necessary to have a better
understanding of the way things currently stand. While there are many
procedures that may be performed to challenge a patent after it has been
issued, the three at issue for this Note are (1) Inter Partes Review (IPR),10
(2) the related Covered Business Method (CBM) patent reviews,11 and (3)
oppositions.12 The first two come from the AIA, whereas oppositions have
been in effect with the European Patent Office long before the AIA took
effect. Of the other two post-grant proceedings under the AIA, post-grant
reviews are seldom utilized due to time constraints,13 and ex parte
reexaminations are almost exclusively used by the patentee, or patent
holder, to either broaden or limit the scope of the patent.14
A.

Inter Partes Reviews

IPRs and CBMs are relatively recent proceedings, having been
introduced in the AIA in 2011 and going into effect in 2013 with the intent
of providing a quick, cost-effective way to invalidate meritless patents.
6. See generally id.
7. Gene Quinn, Patent Abuse or Genius? Is Kyle Bass Abusing the Patent System?,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/08/is-kyle-bass-abusing-thepatent-system/id=56613/ [https://perma.cc/2C9C-7E3X].
8. Although NPEs often get a negative reputation, there are many nonmalicious reasons to assert
a patent that a party does not own. For example, if a party gains a patent through a bankruptcy and has
neither the expertise nor the resources to practice the technology, it is often forced to pursue actions
in order to keep from being estopped from asserting the rights later.
9. Gene Quinn, In Search of a Definition of the Term “Patent Troll,” IPWATCHDOG (July 18,
2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/18/definition-patent-troll/id=11700/ [https://perma.cc/
2BCB-HX4Q].
10. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
11. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300 (2018).
12. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 99, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as
amended Nov. 29, 2000).
13. PGRs must be filed within nine months of a patent being granted. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
Although this is the same time frame as oppositions, unsuccessful PGR proceedings carry wide
estoppel provisions and are therefore risky to bring without extensive review of the prior art.
14. Scott McKeown, Is There Value to Ex Parte Patent Reexamination After the AIA?, PATENTS
POST GRANT (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/is-there-value-in-ex-parte-patentreexamination-after-the-aia [https://perma.cc/NQ9R-TXA9].
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Recently, IPRs, and to a lesser extent post-grant reviews,15 have come
under intense scrutiny because of their ability to invalidate patents without
requiring a full trial or patent examiner review.16 Instead, these reviews
are judged by a panel of three members from the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board (PTAB).17 To understand the controversy surrounding these
procedures, there must first be an understanding of how such procedures
operate and what advantages and disadvantages are faced by patentees and
third parties.
Because it was introduced with the AIA, IPRs may only be initiated
on patents that have effective filing dates on or after March 16, 2013.18
IPRs may be instituted by any third party looking to invalidate any number
of claims disclosed in the patent and may be filed any time between nine
months after the patent has been issued and its expiration.19 The subject
matter that may be challenged with an IPR is limited in scope, and only
issues concerning novelty20 and obviousness21 may be considered.22 The
evidence used to challenge a claim with an IPR is also limited, with only
earlier patents and publications allowed; the on-sale bar23 and
patentability24 issues are not applicable in IPR hearings. Because IPRs are
an expedited proceeding, the process may only take up to eighteen months
to proceed.25 Once a petition for an IPR has been filed, the patentee may
file a response as to why the petition should be denied.26 Additionally, the
patentee also has the one-time opportunity to amend or remove the
challenged claims, or substitute new claims to replace the challenged
claims.27
Once an IPR has been requested, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) must grant such request if it is “more likely
than not that a claim is unpatentable or if the IPR raises any novel legal
questions.”28 The proceeding goes before the PTAB and runs much like
15. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
16. Matt Levy, Three Crucial Words in Patent Reform: Inter Partes Review, PAT. PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/2015/05/14/three-crucial-words-in-patent-reform-inter-partes-reviewpart-1/ [https://perma.cc/W4UJ-EBSN].
17. Id.
18. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW 627 (4th ed. 2015).
19. Id.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
22. Id. § 311(b).
23. Essentially, if a patented object has been sold for more than a year before the filing of a
patent, it may not be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
25. Id.
26. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 628.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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any other litigation with motions, discovery, and eventually a “trial.”29 At
the end of such trial, the PTAB either certifies that the claims, original or
amended, are valid or invalidates the challenged claims.30 Any decisions
by the PTAB are appealable to the district court, assuming the party has
standing.31
There are risks to a challenger in petitioning for IPRs if the claim is
eventually found to be valid, however. If the PTAB declares claims to be
valid, the petitioner and its privies forever lose the ability to not only raise
the same issues again but also the ability to raise any issues that
“reasonably could be raised.”32 While this is a great boon to patentees,
much controversy exists over the procedural differences between arguing
the validity of a patent in front of the PTAB and the more traditional route
of defending patents in federal court,33 with the greatest of these
controversies being centered on the standard of proof for invalidity.34
B.

Covered Business Method Patent Review

The transitory program for covered business method patent reviews
is a special type of subset of post-grant reviews that covers, not
surprisingly, business method patents. As the name implies, the process is
not intended to be in effect permanently and will sunset in 2020.35
Business method patent reviews are a special proceeding carved out in
response to perceived abuses of business method patents.36 In particular,
the federal circuit has limited covered business method patents to “a patent
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does
not include patents for technological inventions.”37 Whether a patent is for

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Levy, supra note 16.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)–(2) (2012).
33. A Closer Look at the PTAB’s New Post-Issuance Review Procedures, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 44, https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/9/1/v3/910/ACloserLookatthe
PTABsNewPostIssuanceReviewProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG9C-9CRA].
34. In IPRs, invalidity need only be shown by a preponderance of evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)
(2012). At trial, invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
35. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 330
(2011).
36. Joshua Zarabi, Covered Business Method–Is There a Limit to What Is “Covered”?, CARTER
DELUCA FARRELL & SCHMIDT LLP (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.cdfslaw.com/publications/coveredbusiness-method-limit-covered-2/ [https://perma.cc/KB6H-DR5P].
37. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329; see also Versata Dev. Grp.
v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that a technological patent is one in
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a technological invention or a business method is determined on a caseby-case basis.38
CBMs have slightly different qualifications than IPRs for who may
bring an action and what may be used to attempt to invalidate a claim. In
order to initiate a CBM proceeding, a plaintiff must be someone who has
been either sued or charged with infringement of a CBM patent.39
Compare this to IPRs, where any third party can initiate a proceeding. The
prior art that is allowed to challenge a CBM is also slightly narrower than
IPRs, limiting any § 102 art to § 102(a).40 Challenges may still be
maintained using patents or printed publications or § 101.41
The trade-off for having a more stringent standing requirement
compared to IPRs is the lesser extent that a petitioner is estopped after an
unsuccessful CBM proceeding. Parties who unsuccessfully challenge a
business method are only estopped from raising the same issue in the
future but are free to challenge based on different issues in a future
proceeding.42
C.

Oppositions

Oppositions are procedures in the European Patent Office (EPO) that
are very similar to inter partes reviews. The two main procedural
differences are in the timeline the procedure is available and in the party
allowed to initiate the opposition. The window to initiate an opposition is
a scant nine months after a patent has issued, similar to post-grant
reviews,43 but far narrower than the years available for IPRs.44
The other key difference is who may initiate an opposition. Unlike
the United States, a party may remain anonymous in bringing an
opposition in the European Union.45 Comparatively, an initiation of an IPR
must state the real parties in interest.46

which “the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is novel and
unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution”).
38. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2018).
39. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B).
40. Id. § 18(a)(1)(C)(ii).
41. Id. § 18(a)(1)(C).
42. Id. § 18(a)(1)(D).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
44. Michael J. Flibbert et al., Coordinating European and U.S. Post-Grant Patent Opposition,
FINNEGAN (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/coordinating-european-and-u-spost-grant-patent-opposition.html [https://perma.cc/4B6E-4T29].
45. Id.
46. Id.
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WHY BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS ARE VULNERABLE TO
CHALLENGE UNDER INTER PARTES REVIEW

Recently, pharmaceutical companies have been facing a large
number of difficulties, even beyond problems from IPRs. The ongoing
pharmaceutical “patent cliff”47 is estimated to cost the industry over $200
billion worth of patent expiration.48 Recent controversies have arisen from
the pricing of medical devices and drugs.49 Disputes involving health care
and the coverage of very expensive drugs have made headlines.50 In short,
public perception of pharmaceutical companies has seldom—if ever—
been lower than it is today. And yet, the public needs biotech companies
to continue to cure diseases and solve the world’s problems, and the
outstanding cost of discovering drugs must be covered by a relatively high
price of such drugs.
The greatest enemy facing biotechnology companies, however, is the
IPR. Biotech companies are acutely vulnerable to patent challenges, and
inter partes review in particular, because (1) biotech patents have limited
ways of extracting value from innovations without patent protection; (2)
massive regulatory oversight in biotech products slows innovation; (3)
fewer patents in biotechnology expose companies to substantial risk if one
of them is blocked; and (4) the expense and risk of developing patentable
pharmaceutical products is substantial. This vulnerability comes at a great
risk: the public relies on lifesaving developments from the biotechnology
industry.
A.

Biotech Patents Are Limited in Ways to Make a Profit

Biotech patents can be readily differentiated from many other types
of high-tech products like computer software, robotics, and computer
technologies in a few key ways. Unlike software and many electronic
47. “A ‘patent cliff’ occurs when a relatively large number of blockbuster prescription drugs lose
their patent protection within the same year.” 2016: A ‘Mini-Cliff’ for Drug Patents,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE (June 9, 2016), https://consultant.uhc.com/articleView-16864 [https://perma.
cc/7RNW-UABB].
48. Angela Sands, Top 10 Patent Losses to Watch out for, TOTAL BIOPHARMA, http://www.
totalbiopharma.com/2014/06/06/top-10-patent-losses-watch/ [https://perma.cc/R3AW-4Q5V].
49. See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Keri Geiger, Shkreli, Drug Price Gouger, Denies Fraud and
Posts Bail, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-martin-shkrelisecurities-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/Y4M4-QTNZ] (detailing the public outcry concerning the CEO
who raised the price of an AIDS drug over 5,000%); Brad Tuttle, Why the EpiPen Price Scandal Sums
up Everything We Hate About Big Business & Politics, TIME: MONEY (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://time.com/money/4502891/epipen-pricing-scandal-big-pharma-politics/ [https://perma.cc/
A25V-UN9F] (describing the outrage involved in the sudden increase in the EpiPen price).
50. See Jake Harper, States Deny Pricey Hepatitis C Drugs to Most Medicaid Patients, NPR
(Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/12/27/460086615/states-deny-priceyhepatitis-c-drugs-to-most-medicaid-patients.
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patents, there are few ways for a pharmaceutical company to recoup the
capital spent in developing a product without the monopoly protection of
a patent. 51 Many drugs are relatively easy to reverse engineer,52 so there
is little possibility of keeping them protected by trade secrets. In addition,
since few people ever become truly brand loyal to drug companies when
it affects their wallets, being first to market provides little advantage
against generics and biosimilars. 53
B.

Government Oversight Stifles Biotech Innovation

Biotech patents also differ from other high-tech patents in the sheer
amount of governmental regulation involved. For example, in order to
introduce a drug to market, a drug must pass through a lengthy three-step
process of clinical trials with the FDA. After years spent developing a
promising candidate, the clinical trials take, on average, eight to twelve
years.54 There is little that can be done to shortcut this process without
sacrificing patient safety. The public good is served best when the drugs
that are sold have been found to be safe or at least acceptably dangerous
compared to the alternative of withholding treatment. However, this
means that there should be a presumption of usefulness and necessity for
any drug that eventually gets to market; no rational developer would risk
the time and money on a product that has no value to the public.
C.

The Small Number of Biotech Patents Exposes Companies to
Risk If Patents Are Challenged

Another reason biotech companies are particularly susceptible to
patent challenges is the relatively small number of patents a single
company will rely on. Unlike software or hardware companies, most
innovative biotech companies operate with a very small patent portfolio.55
While the large companies still carry a significant portfolio, the identity of

51. See generally Himanshu Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, J. PHARMACY &
BIOALLIED SCI., Jan.–Mar. 2012, at 2.
52. See Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: The Biotech Business, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG. (2006), http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html#P25_4185
[https://perma.cc/KJ6L-P8ZC].
53. Denise Myshko, The Rise of Biosimilars, PHARMAVOICE (Sept. 2014), http://www.
pharmavoice.com/article/biosimilars/ [https://perma.cc/28JF-7V9Z].
54. See generally Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval
Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 362 (2001).
55. The Impact of Abusive Patent Litigation Practices on the American Economy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1–2 (2015) [hereinafter Sauer Testimony] (testimony
of Hans Sauer, Ph.D., Deputy Gen. Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Industry
Association),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-impact-of-abusive-patent-litigationpractices-on-the-american-economy.
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who is actually innovating and discovering new drugs has changed
significantly in the past few years.56
A significant change in the biotech and pharmaceutical world is who
is coming up with new drugs and how those drugs are being marketed.
Recently, there has been drastically less innovation from large companies,
such as Roche and Pfizer, and much more innovation from small biotech
startups.57 In 2015, over sixty percent of new approved drugs came from
small biotech firms.58
Part of the reason less innovation is coming from large corporations
is the amount of overhead involved in running bulky, bureaucratic
entities.59 Small companies have the luxury of devoting their complete
time and attention to developing useful products, while large companies
must deal with management, overhead, and feuding departments.60 One
study found that in larger corporations, most research and development
(R&D) employees will put personal and departmental priorities over team
and innovation goals.61 This amount of bureaucratic headache leads to the
formation of many small biotech companies as top scientists leave
management to return to the laboratory.
While smaller companies can allow innovative scientists more
freedom to concentrate on developing drugs, they are also highly
susceptible to any threats to their patents and income streams. These
companies have no “blockbuster drugs”62 to carry them financially while
fighting any patent challenges, and they often rely solely on investment
from venture capitalists.63 Challenges to such patents can lead to the death
of a company because the cost to defend against such claims can total
upwards of $1 million.64 The lifecycle and goal of small companies is to
innovate, patent, and either make all of their money through licensing their

56. Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups/ [https://perma.cc/KF8U-9FMS].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Peter Tollman et al., Can R&D Be Fixed?: Lessons from Biopharma Outliers, BOS.
CONSULTING GROUP (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2011/biopharmaceuticalsinnovation-can-r-and-d-be-fixed.aspx [https://perma.cc/HZ52-VFHD].
62. Defined as a drug “where annual global turnover for that medicine exceeds US$ 1 billion.”
Preliminary Report of the Directorate-General for Competition on the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,
at 7 (Nov. 28, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FK-VWW2].
63. Alsever, supra note 56.
64. Gene Quinn, BIO, PhRMA Lobby for IPR Fix to Insulate Their Patents from Challenge,
IPWATCHDOG (July 26, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/26/bio-phrma-lobby-for-iprfix/id=59965/ [https://perma.cc/8FSL-YVLQ].
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technology65 or being swallowed up by larger companies with the
manufacturing capability to capitalize the technology.66
D.

Expense in Researching and Developing a New Drug

A fourth reason biotech products are so sensitive to patent challenges
is the expense and risk involved in developing a new drug. The average
cost of developing a new drug and getting it to market is a staggering $2
billion.67 The problem is apparent from an earlier report showing a funding
gap of over $1 billion in the European market.68 Coupled with the expense,
developing a new drug is an incredibly risky financial undertaking. The
percentage of drugs that make it to clinical trials is only about 30%, and
only 0.02% of all drugs developed ever make it to market.69 Because it
takes over a decade to begin to recoup such costs, biotech companies must
rely heavily on patent certainty in the future.70 With less certainty of a
return on investment comes a far more difficult time enticing venture
capitalists to finance a new business.71
E.

Biotech Companies Provide a Valuable Service to the Public

Beyond the mere financial benefit for biotech companies,72 the global
public is profoundly dependent on biotech products. The world’s
population is expanding, and new advances in genetically modified (GM)
food will allow for more food growth using fewer resources.73 Humanity
is experiencing the longest life expectancy in history, and it depends on
new drugs to cure a variety of maladies from diabetes to arthritis to
cancer.74 While weaker patent protection may seem beneficial because it
65. Burrone, supra note 52.
66. This is evidenced by the massive surge in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity within
the biotech industry in the last few years. In 2015 alone, over $300 billion worth of M&A activity was
carried out in the pharmaceutical sector. See An All-Time Record Year for Pharma/Biotech M&A in
2015, THEPHARMALETTER (July 1, 2016), https://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/an-all-timerecord-year-for-pharma-biotech-m-a [https://perma.cc/NAU6-8PU8].
67. Sauer Testimony, supra note 55, at 4.
68. Burrone, supra note 52.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Obviously, it is also good for the economy to have profitable companies who are able to hire
more employees. It is estimated that biotech companies spend over $20 billion on research alone, not
to mention the jobs created in manufacturing, distribution, etc. See id.
73. See generally NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE USE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CROPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2003), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/GMCrops-Discussion-Paper-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVD4-54VS] (highlighting the benefits of GM
crops in growing more crops in harsher environments and using GM crops to alleviate nutritional
deficiencies in developing countries).
74. Max Roser, Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/lifeexpectancy/
[https://perma.cc/GY3F-WQPY].
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creates lower prices in the short-term, fewer venture capitalists would be
willing to invest in innovative companies without the ability to recoup
R&D expenses.
III.

IPRS SUBSTANTIALLY HARM BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
AND GROWTH

Inter partes and post-grant reviews were created for a worthy
purpose: to decrease the cost and time involved in litigating against
baseless patent trolls. Specifically, legislative history indicates that the
intent was to prevent these baseless cases primarily in the technology
sector.75 Whatever the original intent, it seems that the greatest harm from
IPRs is being felt in the biopharmaceutical industry.
The extent of IPR abuse has become so prevalent it was covered in
the Wall Street Journal76 and is largely attributable to one company in
particular.77 The technique of shorting a company’s stock and then filing
an IPR is completely legal and available because of the lack of a standing
requirement for an IPR; “a person who is not the owner of a patent may
file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the
patent.”78 In addition, the requirement to get an IPR instituted is a very low
bar: a petitioner need only demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood” that it
will prevail in showing at least one challenged claim to be unpatentable.79
This has been construed to be low enough that the likelihood could be even
less than a 50% chance of a claim being unpatentable.80
Even without an IPR invalidating a patent, the mere filing of an IPR
has been shown to have dramatic consequences. For example, when the
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (CFAD) first filed an IPR against Acorda
Therapeutics looking to invalidate its patent on Ampyra, a drug that
75. Gene Quinn, Patent Abuse or Genius? Is Kyle Bass Abusing the Patent System?,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/08/is-kyle-bass-abusing-thepatent-system/id=56613/ [https://perma.cc/XC9A-5D9M].
76. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the
Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kylebass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408.
77. Much of the abuse of IPRs has been brought to light by the actions of one company, the
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (CFAD). While the company’s stated goal is to decrease drug prices
and increase the availability of generics, its strategy has been to short a company’s stock, file an IPR
against that company’s best-selling product, and reel in the profits. See Quinn, supra note 75; Kyle
Bass: The U.S. Still has a Drug Problem, VALUEWALK (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:57 AM), http://www.
valuewalk.com/2016/11/kyle-bass-iprs-the-u-s-still-has-a-drug-problem/
[https://perma.cc/CJ9QMRGT].
78. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
80. Scott E. Kamholz, The Death Valley for Petitioners in IPR, PTAB BLOG (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.ptab-blog.com/2015/10/26/the-death-valley-for-petitioners-in-ipr/
[https://perma.cc/
X2PG-X7UD].
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allowed multiple sclerosis patients greater mobility, the company’s stock
prices dropped 9.7%.81 When the IPR was later instituted, the stock
dropped an additional 7.8%.82 This stock drop was not due to a final
decision or invalidation of a claim but simply from the PTAB instituting
the hearing and looking into the allegations. Although no claims were
invalidated, Acorda’s investors lost over $150 million in response to the
IPR.83
IV.
A NOVEL APPROACH TO “FIXING” THE INTER PARTES REVIEW
PROCEEDINGS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS BY A HYBRIDIZATION OF
COVERED BUSINESS METHOD REVIEWS, OPPOSITIONS,
AND COMMON SENSE
Inter partes reviews were surely not meant to be abused for financial
gain and were not designed to help invalidate otherwise valid patent
claims. Unfortunately, this has been the result, and while there is
consensus that the system is broken, there seems to be little consensus on
how to fix it. A recent proposal raised in the House Judiciary Committee
was designed to shield pharma patents from IPR review; however, it never
made it out of committee.84 Other attempts have been made to contest the
constitutionality of post-issuance reviews, though they too have been
largely unsuccessful.85Although the Supreme Court has been deliberating
the constitutionality of IPRs in the Oil States case, the consensus among
patent professionals is that the Court will likely uphold IPRs as
constitutional.86 Other legislative attempts have focused on amending

81. Michael Loney, Kyle Bass IPRs End up with 57% Institution Success Rate, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. (June 13, 2016), http://www.managingip.com/Article/3561885/Kyle-BassIPRsend
upwith57institutionsuccessrate.html.
82. Id.
83. Jim Greenwood & John Castellani, Congress Must Keep Trolls Away from Medical Patents,
THE HILL (July 20, 2015), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/248567-congress-must-keep-trolls-awayfrom-medical-patents [https://perma.cc/BX3D-8MM7].
84. Quinn, supra note 64.
85. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Tech. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (denying any ability of
a patentee to appeal the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR, whether as an interlocutory or final
appeal, and upholding the PTAB’s practice of interpreting claim language in their “broadest
reasonable construction.”); MCM Portfolio v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016). In MCM, the court upheld the rule that patents are seen as public
rights and are therefore justiciable in non-Article III courts. See id. at 1289. In addition, the court held
that Congress had given the PTO rights to exterminate patents in reviews under the AIA, and that
because IPRs are akin to administrative proceedings there is no issue with Seventh Amendment jury
trial rights. See id. at 1293. By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court demonstrated its unwillingness
to hear a constitutional argument against the IPR system itself.
86. Gene Quinn, Predicting Oil States after Supreme Court Oral Arguments, IPWATCHDOG
(Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/28/predicting-oil-states-supreme-court-oralarguments/id=90558/ [https://perma.cc/K2MN-Q8WL].
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patent litigation laws, but because the issues arise during IPRs—not
litigation—such reforms are unlikely to be of any help.87
In light of the lack of solutions to the current problem, I endeavor to
put forward a novel approach to improve IPRs by borrowing from other
procedures in order to cure the most egregious defects of the IPR process:
the standing requirement is too low, the amendment procedure is too
draconian, and the claim interpretation is too biased towards the patent
challenger.
One of the greatest criticisms for IPRs is that, unlike cases in Article
III courts, there is no standing requirement to initiate an IPR. Anyone who
has unearthed allegedly invalidating prior art may file a review with the
PTAB.88 Because the Supreme Court has largely avoided any challenges
of IPRs on constitutional grounds,89 the duty to solve the standing issue
must fall upon Congress. Abuse of IPRs in meritless cases can be
addressed most simply by creating a requirement that those who intend to
initiate an IPR must either be defendants in an infringement suit or must
have been sent a cease-and-desist order by the patentee, similar to a CBM.
This keeps the process of invalidating unworthy patents relatively
inexpensive but assures that only parties with some legitimate interest in
the validity of the patent can move forward with an IPR.
Another harsh aspect of the current IPR proceedings is the difficulty
of getting a challenged claim amended. Although statutes permit patentees
to cancel a challenged claim and make a reasonable number of
amendments,90 the amount of amendments that the PTAB has granted is
incredibly low—around seven percent of amended claims have been
allowed by the PTAB.91 In oppositions with the EPO, however,
amendments are looked at more favorably, leading some companies to
attempt amendments with the EPO in order to discern which amendments
to bring with the PTAB.92 Compared to the “kill rate” of over seventy-five

87. See, e.g., Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (requiring increased
pleading requirements for patent infringement action and easier fee shifting); Saving High-Tech
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (attempting
to deter patent trolls by allowing defendants to declare the plaintiff a patent troll and then force a fee
shift to the loser); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013) (forcing the disclosure
of the real party in interest when initiating an infringement suit).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
89. See supra text accompanying note 85.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012). In practice, this has generally been understood to limit one
amendment per challenged claim.
91. Greg Lantier & John LeBlanc, Observations on Amendments in an Inter Partes Review,
WILMERHALE (Feb. 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedfiles/shared_content/editorial/
publications/documents/2015-02-ip-today-observations-amendments-in-an-ipr.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9EV3-2ATX].
92. Flibbert, supra note 44.
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percent of claims challenged in IPRs at the PTAB,93 seventy-one percent
of opposition claims survived in either the original or amended form.94
The major distinction between the two proceedings is who has the
burden of showing the validity of amendments. In the United States, the
patentee making the amended claims bears the burden of proving
validity,95 whereas in Europe, the opposition has the burden of proving
invalidity.96 The trade-off is that in oppositions there is no estoppel barring
arguments that the challenger could have made in later challenges like
there is in IPRs.97 In the interest of making amendments easier, it is
reasonable to trade off the possibility of having to defend further actions
in order to keep a claim from being invalidated, and it would go a long
way in preventing the death of legitimate patents if instituted.
The last amendment that should be made to biotech IPR proceedings,
and really to every post-issuance challenge proceeding, is to have
consistent claim interpretation for trials and post-issuance reviews.
Though this viewpoint is neither novel nor unique, it is simply good
common sense to give a patent that has been issued the presumption of
validity.98 When the PTAB construes claim language, it gives the terms
the “broadest reasonable construction.”99 However, in ordinary court
proceedings, claim terms are given the “ordinary meaning . . . as
understood by a person of skill in the art.”100 This discrepancy allows a
much lower bar to invalidate patents at the PTAB than at trial because
when terms are given a broader construction there is a greater chance that
prior art will cover the claims, thus invalidating them.
Most recently at the Supreme Court, Cuozzo argued that IPRs are
meant to be “mini-trials” and should therefore use the same construction
standard as at trial,101 but the Court ultimately rejected this argument
claiming public policy concerns about stifling innovation.102 However, to
promote innovation there has to be a reasonable assurance of a return on
investment, and a presumption of validity creates a solid investment.
93. Richard Baker, America Invents Act Cost the US Economy over $1 Trillion, PATENTLY-O
(June 8, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html [https://perma.cc/
559D-69B9].
94. Flibbert, supra note 44. Of all claims challenged in 2013 through oppositions, forty percent
of amended claims survived the process. Id.
95. This burden is currently being litigated with the Federal circuit en banc in In re Aqua
Products 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
96. Flibbert, supra note 44.
97. Id.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
99. 37 CFR § 42.100(b) (2018).
100. Cuozzo Speed Tech. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
101. Id. at 2143.
102. Id. at 2145.
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Making an IPR less of an unknown risk would make IPRs far less desirable
to opportunists looking to bring meritless challenges without chilling
parties looking to challenge truly suspect patents.
CONCLUSION
Post-issuance challenges such as inter partes review and post-grant
reviews were created in response to a legitimate problem of patent trolls
within the then-existing patent system. Unfortunately, by suppressing a
problem in one area of technology, a new and significant problem has
arisen in the biotech industry. By creating a system that makes it easier to
invalidate a patent without any necessary standing, inter partes reviews
have allowed uninterested third parties to throw legitimate companies with
valid patents into chaos. Two of the most affected sectors from this abuse
of power have been the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and while
it may seem to be advantageous to the public to have expensive drugs lose
patent protection, the reality is that new innovations in pharmaceutical
technology simply cannot happen if companies lose patent protection.
The most vulnerable to IPR challenges are smaller biotech firms.
These companies often have only one patented drug and limited resources
with which to defend any patent challenges. After putting significant
resources and time into developing a drug, making it past clinical trials,
and being approved by the FDA, these companies have little to no capital
left to defend any legal challenges and no safety net to stay viable while
the Patent Trial and Appeals Board reviews the merits of the review
process. If the future of pharmaceutical development depends on the
continued existence of innovative small companies, the future is fragile
indeed.
Thus far, attempts to curb the abuse of IPRs have largely failed. The
attempts to appeal to the courts have failed, and the legislature seems to
be more concerned with the process of patent litigation than administrative
proceedings. If the suggestions described above—including increasing the
standing requirement for biotech patents to mirror that of covered business
methods, loosening the restraints on claim amendments during reviews,
and keeping claim construction consistent throughout reviews and
litigation—are followed, the goal of efficiently invalidating abusive and
meritless patents would still be achieved without collateral damage to the
biotech industry.

